

STATE OF MARYLAND

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IN THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY

v.

*
CRIMINAL DIVISION
*

EDWARD NERO

CASE No. 115141033
(Filed under seal)

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**STATE'S MOTION *IN LIMINE* REGARDING THE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
EXPERT TESTIMONY AND REQUEST FOR HEARING**

Now comes the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and pursuant to Rule 4-252, Rule 4-263, Rule 5-702, and Rule 5-705 respectfully moves this Court *in limine* to issue a pretrial order regarding the Defendant's proposed expert testimony (1) to bar expert witnesses from testifying to opinions that are contrary to Maryland law or that are not appropriately helpful to the jury, particularly opinions that police departmental policies may not form the basis of a criminal prosecution, opinions tantamount to jury instructions about the law, and opinions constituting legal conclusions about the Defendant's compliance with the law; (2) to require the disclosure of the facts or data underlying the Defendant's expert witnesses' opinions before those experts are permitted to testify to those opinions; (3) to preclude the Defendant from calling any expert witness about whom the Defendant has not provided a disclosure complying with Rule 4-263. In support of this Motion, the State submits the following:

1. The Defendant has recently disclosed that he intends to call a number of expert witnesses to testify as part of his defense. As relevant here, he has identified as such witnesses the following persons: (1) Detective William Boyd, (2) Detective Charles Anderson, (3) Detective Syreeta Teel, (4) Officer Zachary Novak, (5) Officer Mark

Gladhill, (6) Officer Matthew Wood, (7) Lieutenant Robert Quick, (8) Captain Justin Reynolds, (9) Colonel Stanley Branford, (10) Detective Dawnyell Taylor, (11) Sergeant Tashawna Gaines, (12) Timothy Longo, (13) John Ryan (14) Officer Joshua Rosenblatt, and (15) Professor Byron Warnken. Def. Discovery Disclosures at 11-28.

2. Rule 5-702 only permits expert testimony to be admitted to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” with the Court being required to consider before allowing such testimony “whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” “the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject” and “whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.”

3. Moreover, “[g]enerally, witnesses cannot provide testimony presenting a legal conclusion,” and this includes testimony “to a matter of law,” testimony about the expert’s “understanding of Maryland law or an explication as to what Maryland law requires,” and testimony that “appl[ies] any law to the facts of [the] case.” *Randall v. State*, 223 Md. App. 519, 576-77 (2015). As the Court of Appeals has firmly established:

[W]herever opinion testimony is proper, the witness may express his opinion either as to the possibility, probability, or actuality of the matter of fact about which he is interrogated and the answer will not be an invasion or usurpation of the function of the jury, even though it passes upon an ultimate fact which the jury must determine. But this does not mean that the witness may in the guise of opinion upon a matter of fact include in it a matter of law or the application of a rule of law to the facts. [...] No witness should be permitted to give his opinion directly that a person is guilty or innocent . . . or that a person was negligent or not negligent or that he had capacity to execute a will or deed or like instrument or respecting whether a county attorney had probable cause to believe the plaintiff was guilty of the crime charged. But the reason is that such matters are not subjects of opinion testimony. They are mixed questions of law and fact. When a standard or a measure or a capacity has been fixed by law, no witness whether expert or nonexpert, nor however

qualified, is permitted to express an opinion as to whether or not the person or conduct in question measures up to that standard. On that question the Court must instruct the jury as to the law, and the jury must draw its own conclusions from the evidence.

Franceschina v. Hope, 267 Md. 632, 643 (1973) (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, *Basic Problems of Evidence* at 218 (1962)) (internal quotation marks removed).

4. Here, the Defendant has proffered that many of his proposed expert witnesses, particularly Officer Rosenblatt and Professor Warnken, will offer extensive testimony and opinions about the substance and holdings of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, about Officer's Nero's compliance with that jurisprudence, and about other conclusions of law. For example, the Defendant proposes to call Officer Rosenblatt to "testify regarding reasonable articulable suspicion, probable cause, and how those legal concepts apply to the facts in this case," and to opine "that the knife recovered from Mr. Gray is unlawful pursuant to the Baltimore City Code." Def. Discovery Disclosures at 13-14. Likewise, he intends to call Professor Warnken to "testify that the use of handcuffs does not cause a detention to rise to the level of arrest; rather, it is one factor that may be considered in determining whether a 'stop' is an involuntary detention requiring reasonable articulable suspicion, or conversely, whether the 'stop' rises to the level of an arrest requiring probable cause." *Id.* at 16. Such expert testimony is precisely that which the Court of Appeals has explicitly forbidden in *Franceschina*.

Additionally, many of the Defendant's experts' shared opinion that police general orders and policies "are intended to provide internal guidance and discipline and not to form the basis of criminal prosecutions" is an opinion that at once is irrelevant and that also runs contrary to the limitations on expert testimony by offering an opinion—and an incorrect one, at that—about a question of Maryland law. Indeed, it makes no

consequential fact in this case either more or less probable that the authors of police general orders and policies thought such materials could not form the basis of criminal prosecutions. The Maryland Court of Appeals has already squarely disagreed with such an opinion. See *State v. Albrecht*, 336 Md. 475, 502-03 (1994) (evaluating the reasonableness of a police officer's actions using the standards set forth in the Departmental Directives of the Montgomery County Police Department's Field Operations Manual); accord *Mayor of Baltimore v. Hart*, 395 Md. 394, 416-18 (2006) (quoting *Pagotto v. State*, 361 Md. at 557 (Bell, C.J., dissenting)) (“a violation of a police guideline is not negligence *per se*, it is, however, a factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of police conduct”). As such, allowing this testimony about the permissible use of general orders would constitute a defense expert offering an opinion about a point of Maryland law—a matter committed solely to this Court's expertise. This Court should not permit defense experts to supplant and contradict its role as the arbiter and source of settled Maryland law for the jury's consideration.¹

¹ To the extent that there exists legitimate doubt about the law of the crimes with which the Defendant is charged, Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that in such situations, “the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact” Md. Dec. of R. art 23. As *Montgomery v. State*, 292 Md. 84, 89 (1981), held, Article 23 applies “when the jury is the final arbiter of the law of the crime,” a situation which arises only “when an instruction culminates in a dispute as to the proper interpretation of the law of the crime for which there is a sound basis” such that “counsel are granted leave to argue contrary to the court's instruction on the law of the crime” As the Court of Appeals recently noted, *Montgomery* remains good law in its discussion of when and how Article 23 functions, even though *Unger v. State*, 427 Md. 383 (2012), overruled *Montgomery*'s holdings as to its own retroactive effect and as to the appealability of advisory-only jury instructions after a failure to object to them at trial. *State v. Waine*, 2015 Md. LEXIS 630, 4-6 (Aug. 28, 2015). Nevertheless, “[i]nstances of dispute of the law of the crime are an endangered species rapidly approaching extinction” because “[o]nce an appellate court has ruled on the ‘law of the crime,’ the matter then becomes settled law, and thereafter the jury is no longer the judge of the law with respect to that particular matter.” *Allnut v. State*, 59 Md. App. 694, 703 (1984). In those rare instances that Article 23 is properly invoked, MPJI-Cr 2:00 provides a pattern instruction to the jury that the court's recitation of the law is binding but also provides in version B the special Article 23 instruction, “[i]n this case, however, there is one limited area in which it is your duty to decide the law as well as the facts. That one limited area is _____. My instructions in that one limited area are advisory only and are not binding upon you.” Even when this instruction is proper, however, the arguments about the law come from counsel once a legitimate dispute has been identified, not from their experts preemptively during the course of trial.

5. Separately, Rule 4-263(e)(2)(A) requires the Defendant to disclose to the State as to each expert he intends to call “the substance of the findings and the opinions to which the expert is expected to testify” and to provide “a summary of the grounds for each opinion.” Because of this required advanced notice, Rule 5-705 generally allows expert witnesses to offer their opinions to the jury “without first testifying to the underlying facts or data.” As Professor McClain explains, however, “[i]f the opposing party, having been aided by discovery, believes that an expert’s opinion lacks a sufficient basis, counsel may ask the court to exercise its discretion under Rule 5-705 . . . to require the expert to testify to the basis of the opinion first, before stating the opinion or inference.” Lynn McLain, *Maryland Rules of Evidence*, 173 (3d ed. 2007). “If the court finds that the requirements of Rule 5-702 and 5-703 are not met, it will not permit the opinion testimony.” *Id.*

6. Regarding Detective Boyd, Detective Anderson, Detective Teel, Officer Novak, Officer Gladhill, and (6) Officer Wood, the Defendant has not provided a specific disclosure about their opinions or the bases for their opinions other than to say that they “may be called upon to testify that the actions of Edward Nero were reasonable and/or in accordance with accepted police practices” and “may be called upon to testify that [police general orders, guidelines, and procedures] are intended to provide internal guidance and discipline and not to form the basis of criminal prosecutions.” *Id.* at 11-12.

7. For the remaining experts, the Defendant has disclosed more specific opinions but has provided only vague descriptions of the bases for those opinions. Lieutenant Quick’s and Captain Reynolds’s opinions are said to be based on their “review of the records produced during discovery, any written and recorded statements, reports, photographs,

maps, diagrams, and other documents relevant to the actions of the officers,” *id.* at 20-22, with no description of which specific materials they reviewed or how and by whom items were deemed “relevant.” The Defendant states that Colonel Branford’s, Detective Taylor’s, and Sergeant Gaines’s opinions are based varyingly upon their “review of the entire investigation file in the matter of the death of Freddie Gray.” *Id.* at 23-25. At no point does the Defendant clarify what he means by “the entire investigation file.”

Similarly, Mr. Longo’s and Mr. Ryan’s “opinions will be based . . . on [their] review of the discovery produced in this case, including any written and recorded statements, other audio and video recordings, reports, photographs, maps, diagrams, and relevant Baltimore Police Department General Orders and Policies, as well as generally accepted policies, procedures, practices, training, and custom throughout the United States.” *Id.* at 18, 27. The State can only guess at what Mr. Longo and Mr. Ryan actually reviewed given this broad and vague description.

8. In this case, because the Defendant has not provided a proffer of *any* factual basis, much less a sufficient one, for her proposed expert witnesses Detective Boyd, Detective Anderson, Detective Teel, Officer Novak, Officer Gladhill, or Officer Wood, the Court should preclude their expert testimony for the Defendant’s failure to comply with the disclosure requirements under Rule 4-263.² Regarding the remaining experts listed in paragraph 1, the Defendant’s disclosures only vaguely and cryptically identify what, if

² The State would likewise object to these witnesses providing lay opinion that backdoors expert opinion about whether or not Officer Nero’s actions were reasonable. For example, in the trial of *State v. William Porter*, police officers were called as lay witnesses and testified that they believe themselves to be “reasonable” and that they always do the same thing that the defendant there did. A witness’s subjective opinion about his own reasonableness is not remotely relevant toward the legally proper question of whether the witness is objectively reasonable. Allowing a witness to self-identify as “reasonable” and then align his actions with that of the Defendant would merely permit the jury to be prejudiced by irrelevant, misleading testimony by someone without the qualifications to opine about the objective reasonableness of the Defendant’s actions.

any, materials these witnesses actually reviewed in formulating their opinions. Without knowing what these expert witnesses reviewed, neither the State nor the Court can properly evaluate the appropriateness or validity of their opinions.³ As such, this Court should exercise its discretion by requiring these witnesses under Rule 5-705 to explain the full bases for their opinions before they are permitted to share potentially inadmissible testimony with the jury.

Wherefore, the State asks that this Court grant a hearing on this Motion and issue a pretrial order granting the relief herein requested regarding the Defendant's expert witnesses.

Respectfully submitted,

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³ The State, of course, has previously heard testimony from Mr. Longo and Captain Reynolds during the *Porter* trial, but that testimony concerned their assessment of Officer Porter's actions and related to general matters that Officer Porter's attorneys raised. This prior testimony does little to supplement Defendant Nero's deficient disclosure about these witnesses' opinions about the reasonableness of *his* actions or about the matters that *his* attorneys may raise at trial.



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 1st day of February, 2016, a copy of the State's Motion in Limine Regarding the Defendant's Proposed Expert Testimony and Request for Hearing was mailed and e-mailed to:

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Respectfully submitted,

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